University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law

DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law
Faculty Scholarship

Francis King Carey School of Law Faculty

2009

Constitutional Necessity and Presidential Prerogative: Does
Presidential Discretion Undergird or Undermine the Constitution?
Michael P. Van Alstine
University of Maryland School of Law, mvanalstine@law.umaryland.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/fac_pubs
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons

Digital Commons Citation
45 Tulsa Law Review 631 (2009).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Francis King Carey School of Law Faculty at
DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized
administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.

Van Alstine: Constitutional Necessity and Presidential Prerogative: Does Presi

CONSTITUTIONAL NECESSITY AND PRESIDENTIAL
PREROGATIVE: DOES PRESIDENTIAL DISCRETION
UNDERGIRD OR UNDERMINE THE CONSTITUTION?
Michael P. Van Alstine*
Peter M. Shane, Madison's Nightmare: How Executive Power Threatens American

Democracy (U. Chi. Press 2009). Pp. 258. $27.00.
Benjamin A. Kleinerman, The DiscretionaryPresident: The Promise and Perilof

Executive Power (U. Press Kan. 2009). Pp. 322. $34.95.
For those with freedom of action and a corresponding disposition, crises - whether
real or contrived reflect opportunities. Few better examples of this exist than in the
constitutional station of President of the United States. Duty bound to "take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed,"' presidents throughout constitutional history have acted in
times of crisis to interpret, bend, circumvent, and even disregard the law based on
appeals to supposedly higher values. It will little surprise that these actions trend toward
enrichment of executive power. In aggregate, they amply support Edward Corwin's
summary in the last century that "[tlaken by and large, the history of the Presidency is a
history of aggrandizement." 2
In the quarter century since this observation, the platform for unilateral executive
action has only expanded, perhaps markedly so. The reasons are multiple and diverse,
but significant among them are the ever-increasing significance of foreign affairs for the
United States, the lethality of modem terrorism, and broad societal and technological
trends that increasingly empower expeditious, unilateral decision making (e.g., access to
information, communications, travel). With this greatly enhanced freedom of action,
advocates of unilateral executive power found their true champion in a president with an
appropriate disposition, George W. Bush. Propelled by the events of September 11,
2001, and the resultant national security concerns, President Bush advanced claims of
unilateral executive power that were extravagant even against the high bar set by some of
his most aggressive predecessors. The lines of legitimate argumentation were then
further distorted by unserious government lawyers willing to sew cloaks of legality to fit
expected conclusions.
These developments provide the material for two recent books that make valuable
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law.
1. U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.

2. Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers, 1787-1984 (Randall W. Bland, Theodore T.

Hindson & Jack W. Peltason eds., 5th rev. ed., N.Y.U. Press 1984).
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contributions to a rich body of existing scholarship of which Edward Corwin's work
provides a prominent example on the expansion of executive power in the modem
state: Peter M. Shane, Madison's Nightmare: How Executive Power Threatens American
Democracy;3 and Benjamin A. Kleinerman, The DiscretionaryPresident: The Promise

and Peril of Executive Power.4 These two works represent quite different intellectual
traditions (Professor Shane is a legal academic, Professor Kleinerman a political
scientist) and offer starkly different prescriptions. But it is precisely because of the
insights that emerge from contrast that we may profitably treat them in the same review.
Peter Shane's project in Madison's Nightmare is to return the legal and political
discourse over presidential power to a Madisonian view of checks and balances. With,
especially, the stark backdrop of the Bush administration, he argues that extravagant
modem assertions of unilateral executive powers (which he terms "presidentialism")
have resulted in an "unchecked and unbalanced" system. Shane instead advances a
"pluralistic" view of presidential power - and of separation of powers in general - that is
truer to the founders' vision and thus more likely to produce legitimate outcomes. The
"fundamental insight" of the pluralist approach to executive power, Shane argues toward
the end of Madison 's Nightmare, "is that governmental legitimacy. .

demands a

complex network of competing, but interdependent sources of authority."6 He
emphasizes, however, that this legitimacy depends decisively on robust understandings
of the electoral accountability of the political branches not only the executive and,
significantly, on a variety of complex processes that require "bargaining and
deliberation" in the making of public policy. Stated in brief, the modern Madisonian
"nightmare" is that these conceptions of accountability, interdependence, and
deliberation have withered, in both a political and legal sense, under the assault of
unilateral executive power.
Madison's Nightmare begins with two chapters that set a theoretical context for the
more focused analysis to follow. In the first chapter, Professor Shane provides a valuable
review of the "special genius" of the framers in structuring "a multiplicity of legitimating
mechanisms" for the making of public policy. 9 We find here an excellent discussion of
the factors of self-restraint by the three independent branches that historically have
ensured a "constitutional culture," 10 founded both on norms of mutual respect and a deep
sense of the rule of law. Professor Shane then contrasts these historical norms with an
"escalating institutional conflict between President and Congress,"' 1 which, he argues,
has generated "a level of mutual disregard that would have been essentially unthinkable

3. Peter M. Shane, Madison's Nightmare: How Executive Power Threatens American Democracy (U. Chi.

Press 2009).
4.

Benjamin A. Kleinerman, The DiscretionaryPresident: The Promise and Peril of Executive Power (U.

Press Kan. 2009).
5. Shane, supra n. 3, at 1.
6. Id. at 180.
7. Id at 181.

8.
9.
10.
11.

Id. at 180-181.
Id at 8.
Shane,supra n. 3, at 9.
Id. at 12-13.
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at any prior moment in modem times."l2 One might wonder whether this is a bit of
rhetorical excess, for we have experienced quite nasty episodes of interbranch conflicts
in the past.' 3 But the early portions of the first chapter nonetheless provide an excellent
distillation of the factors in our constitutional system that have "produce[d] [a] culture of
self-restraint that averts any serious breakdown of government."' 4
Later in this important first chapter, Professor Shane begins the real focus of
Madison 's Nightmare with the observation that in modern times the president "poses the
most profound threat to our checks and balances system." 15 He convincingly explains
here how the institutional advantages of the presidency - especially the ability to act
unilaterally and with dispatch and secrecy - and the institutional impediments to effective
congressional and judicial control have created a context for dangerous unilateralism. 16
Unfortunately, these insights also are intermixed with broader attacks on the Republican
Party that leave a bit of a taste of partisan politics.1 7 In specific, the book here makes a
number of contestable factual assertions about the structure of the party, nature of its
agenda, voting patterns of its supporters, and character of its members in all branches of
government (executive, legislative, and judicial alike),18 some of which strike a quite
discordant tone following the elections of 2008.19 My point here is not that these issues
are unworthy of scholarly analysis (for indeed they provide rich material for political
scientists). It is, rather, that they risk injecting a partisan distraction - at least a rhetorical
one from the valuable contributions in the remainder of the book about the modem
dangers of unbridled "presidentialism," no matter which party controls the office.
Madison 's Nightmare reasserts its focus in an excellent second chapter, "Checks
and Balances in Law and History." Professor Shane here provides a concise and very
effective summary of the two major claims by modem apologists for unilateral executive
power. The first is the theory of the "unitary executive." At issue here (principally) is the
broad assertion that "the President is constitutionally in charge of the exercise of any or
12. Id. at 13.
13. One might cite as a prominent example the acrimony between the Republican Congress and President
Andrew Johnson over his efforts to disregard Reconstruction statutes, which resulted among other things in the
1867 Tenure of Office Act and, ultimately, impeachment proceedings.
14. Shane, supran. 3, at 10. See also id. at 10-12.
15. Id. at 20.
16. Id. at 20-21.

17. See e.g. id at 3 (referring to a "relentless campaign of the right wing of the Republican Party since 1981
to steer the capacities of our national government toward the fulfillment of a conservative social, economic,
and foreign policy agenda"); Shane, supra n. 3, at 18 (citing with reference to the Reagan administration a
"political agenda of a zealous political faction"); id. at 23 (arguing that "conservative thought leaders[]" oppose
"constitutional views that embrace dissent, deliberation, pluralism, and accommodation").
18. Id. at 22-25.
19. To choose one example, we find in the middle of chapter one an assertion that in the 1995 budget
showdown with President Clinton the Republican Congress "could hardly argue that its position was in service
of democracy." Id. at 14. The reason given is that public polls at the time showed a majority of the populace in
favor of the "President's position." Id. But is this how we are to measure whether one branch of government is
dangerously undermining the constitutional structure? One can confidently assume that the Republican
members of Congress at the time - who were of course popularly elected through democratic processes - saw
their actions as perfectly consonant with the values of representative democracy. Moreover, the criticism of
congressional Republicans at this point in the book runs contrary to later insights of the author on the nature of
a republican form of government. As Professor Shane notes much later in the book, "our dispassionately
determined 'public interest' may or may not coincide with the desires of voters as those desires get expressed
on a single election day" (or presumably in a single political poll). Shane, supra n. 3, at 183.
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all policy making discretion that Congress may delegate to anyone within the executive
branch."20 The second major claim relates to "the degree to which the President enjoys
constitutionally inherent powers in foreign and military affairs that are completely
beyond congressional control," 2 1 which is what the modem controversy over domestic
warrantless surveillance "is really about."22 Through the explanatory vehicles of
President George Washington's Neutrality Proclamation and Justice Robert Jackson's
opinion in The Steel Seizure Case,23 Professor Shane exposes the significant issues at
stake in choosing between "presidentialist" and "pluralist" conceptions of our
constitutional structure.24 Valuable on its own, this analysis also sets the context for the
more focused chapters to follow.
But the best of Madison's Nightmare is to be found in the four substantive chapters
that represent the core of the book. In each, Professor Shane applies his initial insights to
a prominent modem controversy and in the process convincingly demonstrates the perils
of executive unilateralism. It is here, in short, that Professor Shane most effectively
makes his case. The first, chapter three, "Iraq and the (Unlearned) Lessons of Vietnam:
Presidentialism and the Pathologies of Unilateral Policy Making," in fact frames the
essential question for the remainder of the book: "[W]hether the President is likely to
make better decisions against a background understanding that the executive branch is
constitutionally entitled to policy making autonomy" with or without congressional and
judicial oversight.25 We also find here the ultimate insight of Madison's Nightmare: that
decision makers "who have internalized the notion of 'accountability'
the idea that
arguments, premises, and conclusions may all have to be justified to others whose
agreement cannot be taken for granted - will simply work harder in analyzing the options
before them."26 In specific, through the examples of the Vietnam War, the Cambodia
bombing campaign, and the Iraq War, Professor Shane makes the compelling case that a
background norm of required congressional approval
or at least long-standing
acquiescence - is not only more faithful to the Madisonian vision of required checks and
balances; for pragmatic reasons, it is also more likely to produce more deliberate,
accurate, and substantively better outcomes. 2 7
Chapter four derives similar insights from "the breakdown of government
lawyering"28 in recent national security debates. A variety of modern instances of

20. Id at 34.
21. Id. at 31.

22. Id. at 42.
23.

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (Jackson, J.,

concurring).
24. Shane, supra n. 3, at 42-49.
25. Id. at 57.
26. Id. at 61.
27. Id. at 61-81. The references to the insights of a chief architect of the Vietnam War strategy, Robert
McNamara, were particularly compelling. Id. at 76-81. Entirely consistent with the overall thrust of Madison's
Nightmare, McNamara noted that six principal features of unilateral executive decision making reflect serious
impediments to clear-headed analysis: a sense of crisis overload, an unwillingness to examine core
assumptions, a press for consensus, enforced secrecy, intolerance of dissent, and, ultimately, the absence of a
felt need for accountability to others. See generally Robert S. McNamara, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and
Lessons of Vietnam (Vintage Bks. 1995).

28. Shane, supra n. 3, at 82.

http://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol45/iss4/6

4

Van Alstine: Constitutional Necessity and Presidential Prerogative: Does Presi

CONSTITUTIONAL NECESSITY

2011]

635

questionable, or entirely absent, legal analysis by government lawyers provides the
context. Among others, Professor Shane examines the legal reasoning that justified the
29
Bush administration's program of warrantless electronic surveillance of U.S. citizens
and aggressive interrogation practices. 30 He also provides a valuable factual summary of
the internal machinations in the Bush administration to ensure favorable legal opinions
for executive branch authority.31
Professor Shane then connects each of these lapses with prior themes, including
32 from the absence of
the risks that flow from predetermination and intimidation,
34
multiple voices in decision making, 3 3 and from stifling or even punishing dissent. The
real value of the analysis here, however, arises from the insight that, notwithstanding
their essential role, government lawyers are subject to little or no external oversight.
"[M]ost government decisions," Professor Shane observes, "are simply too low in
visibility or too diffuse in impact to elicit judicial review or congressional oversight as
ways of monitoring legal compliance."35 The solution, therefore, is less about legal
prescriptions than about the need for government lawyers to internalize deep norms of a
law-bound government. One might have wanted deeper substantive engagement here and
there.36 But ultimately Professor Shane tells a compelling story here that true legal
accountability must be "buttressed by a set of norms, conventional expectations, and
routine behaviors" that lead government actors to behave according to the law "even
when the prospects of sanction are remote." 37
The remaining two substantive chapters are in the same vein. Chapter five contains
a valuable chronicle of the shockingly expansive claims by the most recent Bush
administration (in particular) to executive privilege as well as of the astonishing 1,400
constitutional objections in presidential signing statements.38 At the foundation of these
actions, Professor Shane asserts, is the "formalist" 39 view that presidential acts are
29. Id at 89-97.
30. Id. at 97-103.
31. Id. at 104-109. Professor Shane also nicely highlights the courageous efforts of some - e.g., Navy
General Counsel Alberto Mora and, later, Office of Legal Counsel ("OLC") head Jack Goldsmith - to control
the more outlandish claims of executive authority. Id. at 106-107.
32. Shane, supra n. 3, at 96.
33. Id. at 103.
34. Id. at 110.
35. Id. at 83.
36. For instance, Professor Shane cites the OLC's conclusion that the president had a unilateral authority to
categorize Taliban detainees for purposes of the Third Geneva Convention. Id. at 98-100. See generally Geneva
Convention

Relative

to

the

Treatment

of

Prisoners

of

War

(Aug.

12,

1949),

http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/375?OpenDocument. One might also have emphasized here the significance
of the initial finding of the OLC that the president had sole authority, as a matter of domestic law, to interpret
treaty obligations. The author's point about misconstruing the Third Geneva Convention as a matter of
international law is valuable. But ultimately, the OLC's position is founded on a deeply flawed assertion that
the president has the authority to interpret treaty obligations more generally.
37.

Shane, supran. 3, at 116.

38. Id. at 135.
39. Id. at 112. The use of the term "formalism" in this context may actually give too much credit to the
executive branch activists Professor Shane criticizes. Formalism is a jurisprudential doctrine, and crediting it to
the Bush administration enthusiasts suggests a veneer of deliberation. But formalism does not equate with
unilateralism. At its most basic, formalism holds that once created through appropriate processes by
empowered lawmakers, legal norms exist, and have at least a determinable content, independent of the legal
institutions that execute or apply them. Whatever "formal" arguments presidentialists advance about the
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legitimate, "so long as executive officials can point, literally, to some formal source of
law." 4 0 He then examines the risks inherent in accretion of this form of "faux law." 4 1
Administrative
Chapter six, "The President's Personal Bureaucracy:
Accountability and the Unitary Executive," directly and effectively engages with the
core claim of presidentialists on executive control over all policy decisions within the
executive branch, including agencies expressly designated by Congress as independent.
It begins by thoughtfully distinguishing between the more limited "overseer" and the
virtually unlimited "decider" models of presidential control over executive agencies. 4 2
What is particularly valuable is the discussion of how modem presidents have followed a
policy that parallels a full-blown theory of the "unitary executive" and how this
"impedes administrative accountability." 4 3 With this perspective, Professor Shane then
compellingly takes apart the principal arguments in favor of a unitary executive. 44 He is
at his best when he connects the assertions of exclusive presidential control over policy
making with the consequences that would flow from a recognition of a broad notion of
executive privilege. 4 5
The penultimate chapter of Madison 's Nightmare, "Recovering the Madisonian
Dream: Visions of Democracy, Steps to Reform," develops the prescriptions for the
accumulated excesses of presidentialism. Here, Professor Shane weaves together the
threads from the four substantive chapters to advocate for an express legal principle
subject to legal enforcement by the courts, but also to political enforcement by Congress
and other constituents in our polity - that presidents must account for their actions. From
this express legal limitation on presidential power will flow significant derivative
benefits for the quality of decision making. "Legal awareness that executive authority is
significantly at the sufferance of Congress and the courts," Professor Shane concludes,
"should lead a President to act with greater prudence and integrity." 46
This connection between executive accountability and improving the quality of
decision making is the most significant contribution of Madison's Nightmare. A
rejection of unbridled presidentialism also will not unduly hamstring the functioning of
the executive branch. To the contrary, on matters of high delicacy and in times of true
emergency, Congress is likely to delegate the necessary policy latitude, and the courts
are likely to afford wide deference in any event Professor Shane even supports "a
readiness to accept fairly regular congressional acquiescence."4 7 Thus, even under the
pluralist view, "the President is likely to find himself frequently vested with sufficient
authority the Constitution confers on the executive branch, they are orthogonal to the issue of which institution

that is, to determine the content of the law. Indeed,
has the final authority to answer the question
notwithstanding the interpretive arguments about the breadth of the Vesting and the Take Care Clauses,
presidentialists, as Professor Shane notes later in his book, in large measure rely on institutional and normative
- not legal - claims about which institution is better situated to create and implement sound public policy,
especially on national security matters. Id. at 120-121.
40. Id. at 112-113.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Shane, supra n.3,at 132-142.
Id. at 143-158.
Id.at 158.
Id.at 158-167.
Id.at 159-161.
Shane, supra n.3,at 185.
Id.

http://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol45/iss4/6

6

Van Alstine: Constitutional Necessity and Presidential Prerogative: Does Presi
2011]

CONSTITUTIONAL NECESSITY

637

power to act independently in many key areas."48
But, in contrast with presidentialism, the twin requirements of ex ante dialogue and
ex post accountability will improve access to information, enhance transparency, and
ultimately support more thoughtful decision making. To propel a move toward this
49
notion of pluralism, Professor Shane offers a number of general policy prescriptions.
Some of these are at a quite high level of abstraction (e.g., the president should "seek to
promote pluralist dialogue and executive branch accountability by returning to an ethos
of open government" 5 0 and should "broaden consultation with Congress in the making of
national policy within areas of shared constitutional responsibility"5 1 ; "the members of
the Senate Judiciary Committee should commit themselves to a merit-centered focus" 52
on lower court judicial nominees). Others, in contrast, have a more directed focus (such
as that the Office of Management and Budget should shift from cost reduction to
interagency coordination 5 3 and that Congress should adopt legislation to resolve claims
of state-secrets-privilege claims in civil litigation 54 ). But each is worthy of further
consideration, especially for subsequent presidents who may be more interested in
broader themes of good governance than in accumulating unilateral powers.
Madison 's Nightmare concludes in a general final chapter with a number of
suggested systemic changes that flow well beyond the subject of the presidential power.
Here, we find nine comprehensive initiatives - "structural reforms in our systems of
politics and political communication"55 - that range from advancing universal suffrage to
increasing the competitiveness of congressional elections to reducing media costs for
candidates and even to "mak[ing] broadband universal and affordable." 5 6 Each of these
may make good sense and may well be worthy of more detailed analysis in other
scholarly projects. Skeptics may also question how these broad political observations fit
at the end of a book that otherwise so valuably focuses on the immoderate claims of
unilateral powers by modem presidents. But these kinds of deep societal and politicalcultural changes are indeed the goal of Professor Shane's fundamental project. For like
most suggestions for a more engaged and knowledgeable electorate, they may also feed
into longer-term values of increased transparency and accountability in government.
In any event, Madison's Nightmare's more focused insights on the excesses of
modem presidentialism make it a valuable and timely work. Through a convincing
review of the Madisonian model of robust checks and balances, Professor Shane reminds
us that the founders designed a system of separation of powers not only to control abuses
by the individual branches of government. By requiring "bargaining and deliberation" 57
among the branches, the system also functions to enhance the quality of decision making
48. Id. at 184.

49. Id. at 186-195.
50. Id. at 188.

51. Shane, supra n. 3, at 189.
52. Id. at 190.
53. Id. at 187-188.

54. Id. at 191.
55. Id. at 195.

56. Shane, supra n. 3, at 205. For a complete discussion of all of Professor Shane's proposed reforms, see
id.at 195-207.

57. Id. at 181.
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by each. And with the backdrop of the extravagant claims of unilateral power by the
recent Bush administration, Madison 's Nightmare persuasively demonstrates the
importance of this "pluralist" perspective for a law-bound and well-functioning
executive branch as well.

Professor Benjamin Kleinerman tackles essentially the same subject in The
Discretionary President, but he offers strikingly different intuitions about the proper
function of law itself. At bottom, the focus of The DiscretionaryPresident likewise is the
consequence of limited accountability for the exercise of unilateral executive powers. A
political scientist, Professor Kleinerman's concern, however, is about an excessive focus
on legal norms, instead of ultimate political accountability. Thus, as he writes in the
introduction, the problem in the recent controversies over the holding and treatment of
detainees in Guantanomo was the exclusive reliance on legal arguments for inherent
executive authority instead of on substantive justification: "By refusing to engage these
questions politically, justifying them to an inquiring Congress or courts, the Bush
administration allowed itself never to engage these questions at all." 58
Professor Kleinerman thus sees a required space for "extralegal" executive
discretion in times of true national crisis. He maps the broad boundaries of this argument
in a quite detailed introductory chapter. With the backdrop of a "new ordinary, where
vast and unthinkable destruction remains a constant possibility,"59 Professor
Kleinerman's project is to highlight the "promise" of discretionary executive action,
even in contravention of the law, while at the same time reminding of the "peril" of the
same phenomenon. The solution is a requirement of robust political, not legal,
justification, but interestingly one that plays out through a process that ultimately returns
the analysis to a constitutional frame. Professor Kleinerman captures this essential point
in a concise passage early in The Discretionary President: To defend the
constitutionality of unilateral action, he writes, "the president must now show the
absolute necessity of executive discretion. In doing so, this power that originates outside
the Constitution comes into the Constitution; it becomes constitutionalized." 60
To fulfill the "promise" of executive discretion, we must not measure this
"absolute necessity"61 against legal norms,62 whether advance congressional
authorization or subsequent judicial rationalization. Where the question is the essential
national security entrusted to the executive, the ultimate audience is, rather, the people.

58. Kleinerman, supra n. 4, at 6.
59. Id. at 12.
60. Id at 10.
61. Id. at xi.
62. Professor Kleinerman thus criticizes legal scholars both for an "excessively legalistic interpretation of
rules and norms" in this context and for the "assumption that the exercise of power can only be judged legally."
Id. at 18. Citing, for example, the arguments of David Barron and Martin Lederman in David J. Barron &
Martin S. Lederman. The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb: Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and

Original Understanding, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 689 (2008), that neither constitutional text nor precedent permits
the president to disregard clear mandates of Congress, he argues that "these authors are mistaken if they think .
. . that presidents can never justifiably act against the laws." Kleinerman, supra n. 4, at 12.
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But Professor Kleinerman also is well aware of the challenge he has set for himself in
locating the control over excessive discretion in the power of political reactions or the
self-interest of the populace: as he notes early in a chapter on Thomas Hobbes, "one of
the central problems with which this book wrestles [is] how to constrain executive power
given a public that is neither naturally disposed to distrust far-reaching executive power
nor made so by a certain crude understanding of the foundational aims of liberalism
itself."63 The answer to this potential failure of the political market is vigilance by the
people's constitutional agents in the legislature and elsewhere in civil society. Professor
Kleinerman thus ultimately endorses, even for times of true national crisis, a Lockean
conception of separation of powers in which legislative elites must "signal the people
regarding executive malfeasance and usurpation." 64
With this overview, The Discretionary President appropriately begins with an
intellectual history of executive power in the Anglo-American tradition. Chapter one first
provides a helpful review of the basic political theory of Thomas Hobbes, and, in
particular, of Hobbes's twin insights about the people's primitive desire for security and
their default tendency to political apathy. In this, Professor Kleinerman sets a theme that
will recur throughout the work. That is, he pairs Hobbes's "inexorable logic of security"
with the insight that, as long as their leaders can promise the people security and
prosperity, "the political apathy bred by liberalism itself creates a trust in an
overweening state power." 65
The succeeding chapter, "Locke's Attempt at Taming the Prince," skillfully
connects this discussion with John Locke's recognition of the necessity for some degree
of executive "prerogative." Even in a politically mature state with primary power in a
representative legislature, Locke recognized "the political flux inherent in the modem
world" may require a "prerogative power" able to react quickly to unforeseeable future
events.66 Because "legislatures cannot predict all future exigencies," 67 Professor
Kleinerman offers the quotable observation that "executive power is merely the
constitutional solution to the insufficiencies of constitutionalism." 68 But he also sees in
this a deeper insight for modem controversies: "What we can learn from Locke,"
Professor Kleinerman concludes, "is that discretionary executive power rightfully exists
69
only when the laws themselves cannot or should not provide for the situation."
The challenge for Locke in parallel with the insight, but not the conclusion, of
Hobbes is the ability of a docile populace preoccupied with their selfish concerns to
police executive excess. 70 The solution for Locke is an "original constitution" 7 1 founded
on separation of powers: because of the complexity of the modem world and the
63. Id. at 27.
64. Id. at 16.
65. Id. at 47.
66. Id. at 58.
67. Kleinerman, supra n. 4, at 59.
68. Id. at 60.
69. Id. at 61.
70. As Professor Kleinerman elaborates, "(flor Locke, the necessary power of the executive combined with
the people's natural docility creates a serious threat to the security of many individuals within society." Id. at
67.
71. Id. at 50.
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people's tendency toward apathy, Professor Kleinerman writes, a mature polity needs "a
constitutional frame within which executive actions that usurp legislative authority come
to light as such and can be used by legislators to show the people this usurpation."72 He
then weaves together these themes with an emphasis on Locke's vision of peaceful
political contestation "both within the people toward the actions of their government
and within the government between the various branches" 7 3 for resolving interbranch
disputes over power. Indeed, Professor Kleinerman concludes, "[b]y separating functions
and powers within the government, Locke both creates the room for this contestation and
encourages it." 74

The four next chapters of The Discretionary President trace early American
thought on and experience with its form of an "original constitution." In a brief
introductory chapter on this theme, "The Federalist Constitution," we find general
observations about early controversies between the federalist and anti-federalist factions
over how best to balance security with liberty. What is particularly valuable in this
chapter is the critical discussion of Woodrow Wilson's reconceptualization of the
presidency as the center point of national political legitimacy. 7 5 In response, Professor
Kleinerman returns to the importance of the Lockean view of the oversight that results
from a separation of functions. Through its division of expertise between (especially)
legislative and executive branches, this separation, Professor Kleinerman observes,
ultimately "gives each branch an incentive to reveal the usurpations of the other." 76
The theoretical analyses of the early chapters provide a backdrop for the essential
question on the ultimate source of executive discretion in times of crisis. Professor
Kleinerman poses it directly at the beginning of the chapter, "Hamilton's Executive
Government": Does the Constitution "provid[e] for all necessary powers in the
constitutional clauses themselves," or does its broader energy instead reflect a
"'constitutionalization' of the insight that constitutions are inherently insufficient for the
maintenance of a secure society in unforeseen situations in the future?" 77 In this chapter,
we find a valuable distillation of Alexander Hamilton's view that the Constitution of
necessity includes all powers required to secure "public peace against foreign or
domestic violence."78 This is so precisely because all future contingencies that threaten
the peace are "illimitable in their nature, so it is impossible safely to limit [the]
capacity"79 of the government to respond to them. The problem here, as Professor
Kleinerman notes, is both that Hamilton fails to explain the structure by which the
Constitution accomplishes that end and that Hamilton's perspective is "so unbounded" 80

72.
73.
74.
75.

Kleinerman, supra n. 4, at 75.
Id. at 75.
Id
Id. at 81-90.

76. Id. at 87.

77. Kleinerman, supra n. 4, at 92.
78. Id at 96 (quoting Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 31, in Alexander Hamilton, John Jay & James
Madison, The Federalist 188, 190 (Edward Mead Earle ed., Modem Lib. 1937)).
79. Id. (quoting Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 34, in Alexander Hamilton, John Jay & James
Madison, The Federalist203, 205 (Edward Mead Earle ed., Modem Lib. 1937)).
80. Id
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as to preclude any serious assessment of what might reflect a usurpation of power.
Interestingly, Professor Kleinerman also faults Hamilton the commonly understood
for insufficiently endorsing the need for executive
champion of executive power
discretion in this context. "The problem with Hamilton's argument," Kleinerman writes,
"is that he appears to connect this unbounded power to congressional lawmaking power
rather than to discretionary executive power." 82
The remainder of the chapter contains a valuable discussion of separation of
powers in terms of functions a kind of constitutional division of authority according to
functional expertise. As relevant for our purposes, the functional expertise of the
executive highlighted by Hamilton is the ability to act with secrecy and dispatch and to
martial the force of the state to respond to security threats, both internal and external. In
contrast, the functional expertise of the legislature - deliberation better situates that
institution for decisions on declarations of war. Professor Kleinerman thus observes that
when the executive, functionally unsuited to the task, has instead decided to initiate
hostilities on its own, "it should not surprise us that these wars often evince insufficient
forethought and planning."84
Professor Kleinerman is at his best in a thoughtful chapter, "Madison's Landmarks
of Power."85 He explains here how James Madison, writing as Helvidius concerning
President Washington's Neutrality Proclamation, "puts into practice Locke's advice" 86
on the need for political contestation over executive power in order to compensate for an
Madison's vision, Kleinerman explains, was that
inattentive populace.
"[u]nconstitutional actions can be contested through the process of constitutional
politics; unconstitutional principles advanced on behalf of the Constitution must not only
be contested but vigorously attacked." But what was most striking from the analysis in
this chapter is Madison's insight about the dangers of executive usurpation from a
permanent state of crisis. 89 Conscious of the risks of usurpation from an "actual war,"
Madison also worried with astonishing prescience that "[tihe executive, whose power
increases most in crises, can also benefit from 'real or pretended apprehensions of it.' "90
Beyond the episodic risk of executive excesses in times of war, Madison foresaw the risk
that manufactured crises by the executive could "grow[] into a kind of system." 9 1
Madison's Lockean solution, Professor Kleinerman convincingly explains, was a
powerful norm of accountability enforced by the people's legislative representatives.
81. Id. at 96-98.
82. Kleinerman, supra n. 4, at 98.
83. Id. at 102-107.
84. Id. at 104. Professor Kleinerman in part blames these misguided wars on the corrupting influence of the
perspective - propelled in a significant intellectual sense by Woodrow Wilson - that the president is the only
true representative of the wishes of the entire nation. Id at 106-107.
85. Id. at 119.
86. Kleinerman, supra n. 4, at 129.
87. Id. at 129-131.
88. Id.at 130.
89. Id. at 130-137.
90. Id. at 137 (quoting James Madison, Political Reflections, in The Papers of James Madison,
CongressionalSeries vol. 17, 237, 241 (R.A. Rutland et al. eds., U. Va. Press 1991)).
91. Kleinerman, supra n. 4, at 137 (quoting James Madison, PoliticalReflections, in The Papers of James
Madison, CongressionalSeries vol. 17, 237, 241 (R.A. Rutland et al. eds., U. Va. Press 1991)).
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Here again, Professor Kleinerman returns to his theme of the need for ultimate political,
though not necessarily legal, accountability. He relates Madison's conception that when
necessity compels extraordinary unilateral measures, presidents must immediately justify
their actions to Congress: "Necessity is not simply a trump card by which executives can
cover over their departures from the law,"92 Professor Kleinerman explains. "Instead,
they must immediately show the legislature why these particular measures were in fact
necessary."93
Similar to his observations about Hamilton, however, Professor Kleinerman
criticizes Madison for "claiming that the power to authorize discretionary action belongs
ultimately to the legislature." 94 He argues that with such a necessity of advance
legislative sanction, "we are led inexorably to an invitation by the legislature for the
executive to usurp its power." 9 5 I will have more to say about this below. It will suffice
at this point to observe that a formal requirement of legislative authorization does not
mean if the ultimate forum for testing legitimacy is political contestation that the
executive must or will await such authorization before responding to true national crises.
A brief chapter, "Jefferson's Prerogative," reviews Thomas Jefferson's recognition
of the rare need for an executive "prerogative" to act beyond constitutional authority. But
with a belief in the ultimate power and ability of the people, Jefferson argued that the
executive prerogative would be controlled by a requirement of the executive promptly
"throw[ing] himself"96 on the public for their approval. As Professor Kleinerman
explains, however, Jefferson's executive prerogative ultimately is entirely lawless, for he
locates it in a power beyond the Constitution itself.97
Two final historical chapters address the significant constitutional moment
reflected by the Civil War. Although essential to any serious analysis of executive
power, Professor Kleinerman commendably confronts directly the fundamental challenge
with the subject of the Civil War: whether, and if so how, we can distill constitutional
extract from an event that is essentially unique in our constitutional history. During the
Civil War, the country's very existence was in the balance. With the exception of the
War of 1812, no event is even remotely of the same species, family, or genus. Few
would credibly question the power of our constitutional Commander-in-Chief - whether
the Constitution expressly or impliedly recognizes it or simply presupposes it to act
beyond or even contrary to law where the alternative is the loss of the country itself (and
thus of the Constitution). In significant measure, in short, the challenge is that the Civil
War is a singularity.
To his credit, Professor Kleinerman recognizes this. Early in the chapter
"Lincoln's Example," he observes with reference to Lincoln's exercise of extralegal
power, "[p]recisely in its being extraordinary, it establishes no precedent beyond

92. Id at 142.

93. Id
94. Id at 147.
95. Id
96. Kleinerman, supra n. 4, at 152 (alluding to Thomas Jefferson, Ltr. to John B, Colvin, in The Writings of

Thomas Jefferson, 1807-1815 vol. 9, 279, 282 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., G.P. Putnam's Sons 1898)).
97. Id. at 163-164.
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itself."98 President Lincoln undoubtedly took aciions unsupported by the constitutional
powers where necessary to secure a potentially disintegrating union. But as Professor
Kleinerman notes, Lincoln had an exceedingly narrow understanding of "necessity," one
99
that was limited to the very preservation of the Constitution. In the most famous of
quotes, Lincoln thus stated, "I felt that measures, otherwise unconstitutional, might
to the preservation of the Constitution,
become lawful, by becoming indispensible
00
through the preservation of the nation."'1
Professor Kleinerman ultimately distills three important principles from Lincoln's
words and actions by which we may judge extra- or contra-constitutional executive acts:
First, "action outside of and especially against the Constitution is only constitutional
when the constitutional Union itself is at risk." 10 Second, "discretionary prerogative that
violates the laws or the Constitution should only take place in extraordinary
circumstances and should be understood as extraordinary." 1 02 Finally, "a line must
separate the executive's personal feelings and official duty."103 One might understand
this latter point as precluding a claim that, once the union itself is threatened, the
president immediately becomes a dictator for all purposes (or as Kleinerman observes,
that in such a case "all bets are off' 104).
Professor Kleinerman then extends these principles in a more specific chapter,
"The Civil War Confiscation Debate." He first provides here a very interesting
examination of the extravagant claims of some legislators at the time that Congress was,
in all cases and for all purposes, the supreme branch of government and that its powers
even extended to the confiscation of private property founded on military necessity.
Some also argued that, in addition or instead, Congress could delegate such powers to
the president. In either case, as Professor Kleinerman explains, the ultimate repository of
emergency powers, even in disregard of the Constitution, was Congress by virtue,
ironically, of the Necessary and Proper Clause in the Constitution. 10 5
Lincoln's view of the subject was unclear, was influenced by political
considerations, and likely evolved during the war.106 In any event, Professor Kleinerman
sees a serious problem in a conclusion that Congress always has final control over
emergency powers, even through the option of delegation to the president. The risk of
such an approach is that Congress "would be supreme not only to the executive but also

98. Id. at 169. In some later passages, however, we find what appears to be rhetorical backsliding. See id. at
173 ("One can imagine innumerable situations in which this discretionary [executive] power is truly necessary
for the preservation of a society."); id. at 174 (raising the possibility of other "situations in which, as in the
Civil War, the threats are real and immense discretionary power is essential").
99. Kleinerman, supran. 4, at 178.
100. Abraham Lincoln, Ltr. to Albert G. Hodges, in The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln vol. 7, 281,

281 (Roy P. Basle ed., Rutgers U. Press 1953).
101. Kleinerman, supran. 4, at 184.
102. Id. As Professor Kleinerman thus observes with reference to Lincoln's revocation of General John
Fremont's emancipation proclamation for Missouri, "Lincoln draws a bright line between that which the
survival of the Constitution mandates and that which his personal moral feelings might desire." Id at 182.
103. Id. at 184.
104. Id.
105. Kleinerman,supra n. 4, at 197-204.
106. See id. at 214-216.
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to the Constitution."10 7 Professor Kleinerman instead sees virtue in the president taking
the constitutional first-mover risk. That is, if the president exercises questionable
emergency powers on his own with an appeal to constitutional necessity, he is subject to
the ultimate and, thus, constitutional oversight of the people and their constitutional
representatives in Congress. 10 8
The discussion of the Civil War nonetheless would have benefitted from a review
of the Supreme Court's important role in recognizing the war powers of the president. As
the Supreme Court found in The Prize Cases,109 the precise extent of the president's
power to wage war depended decisively on the existence of a legally defined "war." The
Court there noted the important role of Congress in triggering presidential war power
through a declaration of war. But it also held, in light of the clear belligerency initiated
by an organized army, that the absence of a formal declaration did not mean that the
Civil War was anything less than a constitutionally relevant war. 110 As a result, it
within the constitutional and
properly fell to the president to wage the war
internationally recognized laws of war to confiscate property in furtherance of valid
war aims.
In the final substantive chapter, "The Discretionary Executive and the Separation
of Powers," Professor Kleinerman extends his defense of executive discretion to formal
advice for the other two branches of government against the backdrop of a presidential
power to act in defense of the Constitution in times of emergency. He thus observes that
if "members of both Congress and the Supreme Court know that the presidency has an
independent source of discretionary power that supplements the laws ... they can
comport themselves in an entirely different manner than they would if they thought their
decisions as to the extent of executive authority were final." 11 By "comport themselves"
here Professor Kleinerman means that Congress should not undertake to authorize
emergency powers and the Supreme Court should not attempt to make binding
declarations about the constitutionality of any exercise thereof. The worry is that both
institutions are more likely to encourage executive excess than control it. "As long as we
view discretionary executive power as in need of statutory support or judicial
rationalization," he reasons, "Congress and the Supreme Court must necessarily become
enablers rather than questioners." 1 12
With specific reference to Congress, Professor Kleinerman argues that any attempt
to define in advance the extent of executive discretionary power in times of emergency
transfers a proprietary function of the legislature - the power of deliberation in ordinary
times to the executive. This would only enhance powers that presidents claim anyway.
Professor Kleinerman thus cites John Yoo's argument that the Foreign Intelligence

107. Id. at 217.
108. Id. at 216-217.
109.

The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635 (1862).

110. Id. at 666-667 ("When the party in rebellion occupy and hold in a hostile manner a certain portion of
territory; have declared their independence; have cast off their allegiance; have organized armies; have
commenced hostilities against their former sovereign, the world acknowledges them as belligerents, and the
contest a war." (emphasis in original)).
111. Kleinerman, supra n. 4, at 218.
112. Id. at 219.
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Surveillance Act113 ("FISA") did not create executive power, but rather only enhanced
that power with a specific "safe harbor." 114 Professor Kleinerman concludes from this
that the oversight of presidential claims of emergency powers is best left to an ex post
political judgment of our polity: "By removing the necessity of statutory authority for the
exercise of executive discretion, we force that discretion to stand naked before the bar of
political and constitutional judgment."" 5
One might ask here, however, whether it is "necessarily" so that Congress becomes
6
an "enabler" if it deliberates and legislates in advance of national crises.11 Professor
Kleinerman has a valid point for situations in which Congress solely empowers the
president, as the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force 11 7 demonstrates. Yet even
if one were to accept John Yoo's extravagant claims, Congress may fulfill its oversight
function by identifying express limits on executive power. Congress may thus
circumscribe by authorizing within specific limits. For executive assertions of power
beyond those expressly prescribed limits, the political contestation championed by
Professor Kleinerman remains with full vigor.
Professor Kleinerman also paints on a very large canvas, for he seemingly
addresses only presidential actions for emergencies of the highest order. The problem
as, interestingly, Professor Shane highlights in Madison's Nightmare - is the corruption
that may result from an internalization of a crisis mentality at lower levels of
government. As Professor Shane thus explains, "[Mlost government decisions are simply
too low in visibility or too diffuse in impact to elicit judicial review or congressional
oversight as ways of monitoring legal compliance." 118
Professor Kleinerman's concerns about the Supreme Court are multifaceted, but
largely distill into two points: that it lacks the institutional capacity to make judgments
about abuses of power in emergencies 1 19 and that its actions in fact will tend to interfere
with the political contestation that is necessary ultimately to resolve executive abuses of
power.120 His advice for the Court is that it should offer only advisory views when it
confronts a claim of "unconstitutional or illegal action by the executive." 2 1 He thus
reasons that
it would be better for the Court simply to decide the case as it thinks the Constitution
requires and thereby force the executive to defend himself or herself politically and

113. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1871 (2006).
114. John Yoo, War by Other Means: An Insider's Account of the War on Terror 85 (A. Mthly. Press 2006)

("FISA does not create the power to authorize national security searches. Rather, it describes a safe harbor by
which searches that obtain a warrant will be deemed reasonable under the Fourth Amendment."). For Professor
Kleinerman's discussion of this theory, see Kleinerman, supra n. 4, at 224-225.
115. Kleinerman, supra n. 4, at 222.
116. Id. at 219.
117. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
118. Shane, supra n. 3, at 83.
119. Kleinerman, supra n. 4, at 235 ("[T]he courts are simply not equipped to determine the gravity of any
given situation, and thus they are not equipped to determine if the president ha[s] independent power to act.").
120. Id. at 232 ("The Supreme Court's adjudications inevitably create the very sorts of precedents that
impair the people's ability to engage in political contestation over the exercise of power by either Congress or
the president.").
121. Id. at239.
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constitutionally. This will only be possible, however, if the Court is willing to contemplate
the possibility that it will not have the last word. 122
23

Not surprisingly, therefore, Professor Kleinerman endorses "coordinate construction,"'1
bear the joint
not the Supreme Court alone
under which the three branches
responsibility for constitutional interpretation.
Coordinate construction does not require judicial abdication, however. If the true
standard is Lincolnian necessity, why should the Supreme Court not put the president to
the test? Where the president seeks to employ extralegal powers, in other words, the
burden should be a high one: to prove, through the very political contestation Professor
Kleinerman champions, that the extreme necessity of a situation justified a departure
from even a final, binding judgment of the Supreme Court on the force of the
Constitution. And if one were to accept some diluted notion of necessity, how is the
Supreme Court to discern which executive acts fall within the protected zone for
"nonfinal" judicial interpretations of executive power? Moreover, the resultant
uncertainty may well encourage executive branch officials to pick and choose which
judgments of the Supreme Court are constitutionally "final" to fit the president's fancy
from time to time (a form of all-purpose "necessity" trump card).
Professor Kleinerman nonetheless worries that adherence to a policy of final
judicial authority over constitutional meaning will either invite congressional or public
apathy or force the Court "to rationalize and constitutionalize"l24 presidential actions in
true times of emergency. He then properly cites cases in which the Supreme Court was
indeed quite compliant to executive branch desires.125 Thus, for example, he cites the
erroneous conflation of executive and national power made by Justice George Sutherland
1 27
and In re
in Curtiss-Wrightl 26 as well as similar rhetorical lapses in In re Neagle

Debs.128 Professor Kleinerman's basic concern is a valid one, as Justice Sutherland's
extravagant rhetoric in Curtiss-Wright amply demonstrates. But episodic missteps and
rhetorical excesses do not a jurisprudence make. 12 9 And without a review of the great
122. Id
123. Id
124. Kleinerman, supra n. 4, at 241.
125. Id at 235-237.
126. US. v. Curtiss-WrightExport Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (suggesting that the president possesses
as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of
"delicate, plenary and exclusive power
international relations").
127. In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 59 (1890) ("We do not believe that the government of the United States is
thus inefficient, or that its Constitution and laws have left the high officers of the government so defenceless
and unprotected.").
128. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 582 (1895) ("If the emergency arises, the army of the Nation, and all its
militia, are at the service of the Nation to compel obedience to its laws.").
129. Thus, for example, Professor Kleinerman cites Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), as
foundation for a concern that the kind of congressional acquiescence recognized there simply will serve as an
invitation for ever more sweeping claims of executive power in the future. Although the prediction of executive
extrapolation is justified, that of judicial compliance is not. Indeed, when the executive recently sought to
extend Dames & Moore to a much broader power to transform international obligations into domestic law, the
Supreme Court forcefully reminded in Medellin v. Texas - quoting Dames & Moore itself - that "the limitations
on this source of executive power are clearly set forth and the Court has been careful to note that '[p]ast
practice does not, by itself, create power.' " Medellin, 552 U.S. 491, 531-532 (2008) (quoting Dames & Moore,
453 U.S. at 686). Because the claim of independent executive power at issue there was "not supported by a
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sweep of Supreme Court cases on executive power, the risk to flip the well-known
history is an impression of "looking over a crowd
metaphor on the use of legislative
13 0
and picking out your enemies.",
Professor Kleinerman nonetheless offers here a valuable admonition about the
need for a special modesty by the Supreme Court on the subject of emergency powers.
Even more than usual, its proper role is not to fence off and survey the field, but rather
merely to put down an occasional outer-boundary post when confronted with executive
excesses. In this, the Supreme Court both fulfills its rightful constitutional role and acts
fully within its functional expertise. Fairly interpreted, that is precisely what the Supreme
Court has done in its string of cases on the broad claims of unilateral, unreviewable
executive power by the recent Bush administration. In its significant opinions in
Hamdan,'3 1 Boumediene,132 and, especially, Medellin v. Texas,13 3 the Court in fact spoke
boldly in defining the outer limits of executive power, even in the face of claimed
congressional support.
The Supreme Court also has ample tools to avoid straying beyond its institutional
competence. 13 4 The Court has ultimate control over its docket. Even when unavoidable,
it may take shelter in a variety of abstention principles - including, most prominently, the
political question doctrine - to defer or evade particularly sensitive issues. It thus has at
its disposal the means to avoid injecting itself into issues that in fact are best left to
political contestation or for which it has not yet accumulated sufficient information or
experience. With appropriate judicial modesty, in other words, the Court can - and in the
field of emergency powers should limit its (final) declarations to clear instances of
executive excess.
The distilled essence of The DiscretionaryPresidentis that true controversies over
executive discretion in times of national emergency are best left to political contestation
driven, ultimately, by "we the people." Citing the infamous example of the Japanese
internment in World War II, Professor Kleinerman sums up his argument nicely at the
very end of the work:
As I have argued throughout this book, as citizens of a constitutional polity in which the
Constitution belongs, in the first and last place, to us, we can make a political judgment
about this sort of military order in which we decide whether it is ultimately constitutional:
even if we think it a departure from the constitutional order, we might grant its
135
constitutionality by concluding that it was, in fact, necessary.
But there is no compelling reason why law, objectively determined by the courts and in

particularly longstanding practice' of congressional acquiescence," the Court refused to recognize
extraordinary executive powers. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 532 (quoting Am. Ins. Assn. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S.
396, 415 (2003)).
130. See Abner Mikva, Statutory Interpretation:Getting the Law to Be Less Common, 50 Ohio St. L.J. 979,

982 (1989) (equating the use of statutory history with "looking over a crowd and picking out your friends").
131. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
132. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).

133. Medellin, 552 U.S. 491.
134. Professor Kleinerman phrases his concern here this way: "[T]he courts are simply not equipped to
determine the gravity of any given situation, and thus they are not equipped to determine if the president ha[s]
independent power to act." Kleinerman, supra n. 4, at 235.
135. Id. at 243.
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part promulgated by the legislature, may not play a role in our national deliberations. In a
polity founded in its essence on the rule of law, we do not ask too much for the president
not merely
to demonstrate, through that very political contestation, that true
manufactured or feigned - necessity justified a departure from binding, final, and even
constitutional law.
These questions aside, Professor Kleinerman advances a provocative theory, one
founded on thorough research and thoughtful analysis. He deftly straddles the worlds of
both political and legal science. As a result, The DiscretionaryPresident provides a rich
source of information and insight for academics from both disciplines.
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